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Abstract
This article is devoted to a specific case of identification with the Soviet past, when the
latter is not given in mobile and individualized forms of a personal, family or social group
memory, but in the canonized form of a socially recognized cultural representation.
The article analyses different phenomena in contemporary mass culture (films and
television series) and also considers the tendencies of official historical politics.
Although contemporary post-Soviet nostalgia may be described as a secondary
identification with the cinematic representation of one or another era the conceptual
nostalgic framework through which post-Soviet society is often considered must be
corrected. This article proposes the correction can be made via the following thesis: the
modern Russian subject (en masse) is no longer nostalgic for the Soviet past, instead
nostalgic identification is stylistically mediated by the characteristic modes of their
representation in the cinema of the corresponding eras. We should talk about a kind of
fantasmic identification, mediated by the specific modes of their cultural representation.
Keywords: history, nostalgia, melancholia, soviet past, post-soviet subject
1. Introduction
The paradoxical presence of the Soviet past in the culture and common consciousness
of present-day Russia cannot be reduced merely to traumatic effects having to do
with the ongoing ‘reliving’ of this past, nor with the tension between various modes of
perception and description of that past. Nor can it be reduced to the more profound
cognitive dissonance between nostalgic identification with former Soviet grandeur and
the painful sense not only of loss itself, but also of the impossibility of returning to what
is now gone forever. Nor can it be reduced to a sense of ressentiment in relation both
to external and internal enemies, who might otherwise be blamed for this loss.
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2. Materials and Methods
The nostalgic attitudes inherent in the post-Soviet collective consciousness have been
the subject of many sociological polls and studies carried out by Yuri Levada [11–13], Lev
Gudkov [2], Boris Dubin [3–4] and other members of the Levada Center. Of particular
interest are the polls concerning to the reception of Soviet past in contemporary Russia
made by the Levada Center [14], as well as their long-term Homo Soveticus project,
which has gone through five phases of re-actualization in 1989, 1994, 1999, 2003 and
2008. [11–13]
The official discourse of the contemporary elite, which aims to legitimize and redeploy
various forms and symbols of the Soviet past and to rewrite the most dramatic pages of
Soviet history in an apologetic mode, has many times been criticized in liberal academic
circles and by the political opposition [10]. According to this analytical scheme, Putin’s
authoritarianism emerged as a result of a ‘restructuring of the Soviet system’, from
which the current regime has adopted the mechanisms of state management and
economic control, suppressing social and institutional differentiation. Additionally, the
Soviet past has often been described as the main source of the symbolic legitimization
of today’s regime. The following are the key terms that have been applied in order to
conceptualize this situation: conservation (konservatsiia), restoration (restavratsiia), re-
animation (reanimatsiia), re-actualization (reaktualizasitia). Generally speaking, these
terms refer to various forms of ‘a return of the Soviet past’ [5]. In this understanding
of ‘restructuring’, the emphasis lies on reproduction rather than transformation: the
Soviet past’s lingering presence in the post-socialist era is understood not so much
as an eclectic accumulation of institutional symbols and social practices, but rather as
a systematically reproducible mechanism. Ironically, such a critical logic produces an
effect contrary to its intentions: it posits as a whole something that is in fact fragmentary;
it endows that which is purely political-technological and instrumental with an inherent
logic.
3. Results
My main thesis can be formulated as follows. We are no longer dealing with nostalgia
and the desire for a return of the lost object, but with a politics whose objective is the
positive recoding of nostalgia for the Soviet past into a new form of Russian patriotism
for which ‘the Soviet’ lacks any historical specificity but is rather seen as part of a
broadly conceived cultural legacy. The key premise here is not nostalgia itself, but the
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positive ‘channeling’ of its energy, a translation of the politically loaded language of
Soviet symbols into the politically neutral language of a common cultural and historical
tradition, the absorption of the Soviet past within the general past of Russian statehood,
and, even more broadly – within Russian culture as such.
4. Discussion
Mass culture constitutes more than a space for the extraction of commercial profits,
more than a mirror, reflecting the tastes of the mass consumer, and more than a
generator of new and alternative cultural forms. Popular culture can also be a space
for ideological investment [6]. What is more, the apparent contradictions between
commercial interests and ideological investments are often at base rather irrelevant.
The extraction of profit and the achievement of cultural-political hegemony may in fact
be mutually interconnected processes, supporting one another and, in this manner,
achieving maximal effect. Private capital and the state budget may be transformed
into connected vessels through which circulate both money and cultural symbols and
forms, projected as the foundations of normative collective identity. Mass culture, in
turn, becomes an arena in which the economic logic of the generation of profits and the
political logic of achievement of symbolic hegemony become mutually convertible. And
it is precisely this tendency towards the symbiotic coexistence of the commercial market
of cultural production and state cultural politics that may be observed in contemporary
Russia.
One of themost important phenomena arising as a result of this symbiosis is the effect
of the neutralization of history as a terrain of alterity, which demands reflexive analysis
that takes into account political difference, as well as the ideological heterogeneity of the
past itself, and that describes the distinction between the past and the present. In this
capacity, history holds little interest—neither for contemporary commercial neoliberal
economy, which is occupied with the eternal present of market circulation, nor for the
particular form of cultural politics pursued by current Russian elites. The task of the
latter consists in an effort to eliminate all manner of political tension from past history,
to extract from it any possibility of alternative possibilities, transforming it into a patriotic
museum of decontextualized cultural legacies, encompassing a mosaic of fragmentary
elements of the past, liberated from their original meanings, referring only to the singular
and indivisible tradition of Russian statehood. This is a process that we could described
as the “transformation of soviet social, political and cultural models into the ideologically
neutral, yet remarkably popular forms of post-Soviet mass culture” [15].
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Its principles are simple and accessible to all: national culture is more important than
political history, while the ethos of serving one’s motherland is above any ideological
‘controversies’. In the framework of such a narrative, there is no clear-cut difference
between Stolypin and Stalin (efficient managers), Nicholas the Second and Alexander
Solzhenitsyn (national martyrs), Alexander Nevsky and Georgy Zhukov (victors over
the Germans) or, finally, Yury Dolgoruky and Yury Luzhkov (founders of Moscow). Such
equivalencies are in fact the foundation for such a construction of history, in which
paradigmatic correspondence makes possible a transcendence of syntagmatic gaps.
Such a view of history projects a living chain, which on a personal or event-based level
can hold together a line that has stretched for a thousand years.
Renouncing its responsibility before the past, this discourse attempts to neutralize
history as a political space and turn it into a museum of historical legacy objects,
arranged according to the political agenda of the day [8]. This museumification of
culture amounts to a fragmentation of the historical past that removes it from its context
and makes any external critical perspective impossible [1]. This is a typical attempt to
create a grand style from a random mixture of fragments referencing different eras,
historical, cultural, and political contexts. Ironically, whenever ideological justification is
replaced by technological projection, the eclecticism of this grand style reveals its own
inadequacy and internal parody. The paradox, however, lies in the actual desirability
of such a frankly autoparodic and nearly auto-self-deconstructing effect for official
discourse and contemporary mass culture, which is symbiotic with that discourse [17],
[20]. Russian political elites are not interested in a real national uplift and active patriotic
participation, they are interested just in passive identification with the past. So this past
should be reconstructed as organic and obviously artificial in the same time, should
oscillate between a claim for truth and an admission of imitation. Nevertheless people
should not take their patriotic identity too serious but just consume it.
The task of this new official patriotic discourse is not to establish a historical bond
with the Soviet past, but rather to turn Soviet history into the Soviet past once and
for all. This project strives to neutralize the Soviet past as a specific object of either
positive or negative political identification. It is meant to transcend historical debates,
which threatened to split and actually split Russian society since Perestroika. Everything
Soviet loses its historical specificity as an ideological or social project or as a political
and economic alternative to capitalism. It ceases to be a whole, referring to a specific
historical context, and is instead transformed into a part of the historical past of Russian
statehood and national tradition. It is in this de- and re-semanticized forms that the Soviet
past ceases to reflect an actual ideological choice leading to any political demarcation
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and, instead, becomes the foundation for a new social consensus, eliding any kind of
difference and overcoming any gulfs of meaning. “After this ideological and political-
technological “working through” we are dealing with the soviet-free Soviet (like we used
to drink sugar-free coke or caffeine-free coffee)” [9].
In the case of the post-soviet subject an aspiration to surmount the ego’s limits of
space and time and to see the continuation of oneself and one’s personal desires in
all contexts has its own distinctive condition. The traumatic split with an assimilated
symbolic universe; the ruination of a coherent historical narrative; the destruction of a
well-known social context (from an everyday practice to factory buildings); a discursive
deficit associated with the insufficiency of the new languages required for a depiction
of the new reality; the melancholic fixation upon the lost object of desire; the nostalgic
attachment to what has gone that then engenders an excess of the past which societal
consciousness is unable to digest [16, 23] – such are the basic conceptual schema that
a depiction of the post-soviet era is built upon, especially the first post-soviet decade,
the period just before the Putin era of the ‘new stability’ [19]. How the post-soviet
political elite use this social affection for the past is a whole other conversation. Here
the question is how does the mass modern post-soviet subject feel in this seemingly
hopeless situation? And I don’t think that it would be exaggerating to say that it feels
just fine. Having remained in a condition of transit, having comfortably settled into the
spaces of unfinished modernity, having turned the excess of the past into a surrogate
future, having converted the discursive deficit into the basis of a new poetics [18], the
post -soviet subject feels the personal trauma internally like a fish feels water.
The traumatic symptoms bring a particular perverse satisfaction; nationalism and
xenophobia compensate for the fall of the empire; the unwillingness to remember one
thing is balanced against the heightened feeling of commemoration for others and
the nostalgic fixation on the past is recoded into a ‘project of modernisation’ (For a
discussion of both the modern Russian modernisation project, announced in the second
half of the 2000s during the presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev, and of modernization
based on the management of the nostalgic effect see [9, pp. 156–167]). Melancholy
becomes a mechanism of manipulation used by both the melancholic subject, who
has learnt how to control its feelings of loss, and by the political elite, who have
learnt how to control the melancholic subject. Over all of this hangs the warm homely
sphere of narcissistic infantilism, which facilitates the feeling that the ‘other’ is oneself,
turns the external into the internal and alters the boundaries between the ego and the
outside world. The union of melancholy, (made up of the sense of loss), and infantile
narcissism spawns a particular interpretation of history and a particular form of historical
DOI 10.18502/kss.v4i13.7728 Page 335
Convention-2019
representation. The loss of the former symbolic universe brings freedom from the ruling
hierarchical system, from the rules, norms and sanctions. Infantile regression allows for
the arrangement of a diverse combination of smashed fragments from former eras, their
symbols and ideological forms, without distinguishing the familiar from the alien and
in general eliminating the very category of the ‘other’ beyond the limits of narcissistic
fantasy.
If for soviet society the sacred was to be found in ideology, including the material
subjects of mass propaganda, then now, in a time that lacks any ideological anchor
and with capital taking the place of ideology, the memory of a bygone soviet past fulfils
the role of an unseen ‘toehold’. Having shed its initial sacred references to ideology,
this memory cuts through the former era with symbolic fragments. These objectified
fragments then become the objects of a new surrogate sacralization upon which the
unconscious projections of post -soviet subjects are focused and to which they aspire
in their search for self-identification.
A phantasmagoric combination of historic figures, heroic events, mundane items of
daily life and fragments of personal memories await the post-soviet subject. This is a
world of the sacred which has been tamed and yet remains one of the relatively stable
fulcrum of post-soviet society, around which it continues to move. The deconstruction of
the soviet symbolic system turns on the regeneration of its ruin in the melancholic and
narcissistic unconscious of the post-soviet subject. This system, seemingly destroyed
on land, has dived into the social unconscious and dislodged the sediment of new
constellations. In their turn these new constellations become the material for the future
construction of a collective memory, which is substantiated and ontologised, so making
the history of its formation opaque even to itself.
In his workMourning andmelancholy, Freud outlines the basic psychoanalytic dialec-
tic of the melancholic anamnesis: having lost the attachment to the object of affection,
the subject experiences it as a genuine loss of the object. In the face of such a loss,
the libido, which was formerly invested in the lost object, turns on the subject itself and
puts it into a state of stupor and self-abasement. The paradox is that this destructive
self-abasement is the result of a narcissistic assimilation of the subject with the lost
object to which it experiences ambivalent feelings of love-hate: punishing itself, the
melancholic subject punishes the other, the loss of attachment to which it experiences
as a real loss. Therefore, its melancholic suffering is difficult to distinguish from pleasure.
This mechanism of melancholy can be applied both in a description of the subject of
Perestroika and of the subject of the post-Perestroika era [7]. Complaints of the collective
fate, lamentations about personal life and the dark pessimism that is the leading genre in
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representations of perestroika everyday life [22] have all acted as an actively corrosive
element that played its role in the destruction of the soviet order. The loss was played
out until it actually happened: the extreme (painful-ecstatic) experience of separation
from the communist regime anticipated its fall and, in many ways, predetermined it
(completely consistently reproducing the Freudian logic, according to which melancholy
induces the loss of attachment as the loss of its object). However, the past twenty years
history of post-soviet melancholy has endured more than just one stage [21].
Melancholy, having expanded as a mechanism of reaction to the political, economic
and socio-cultural crisis and having acted as a catalyst for its further intensification,
has become not only a habitual means of adaptation but a conduit for a peculiar
emancipation from that order, whose loss it has dramatized. The loss of attachment,
its melancholic experience, the real disappearance of the object, (which doubles the
melancholic affect), the narcissistic identification with the lost object led initially to the
subject falling into a stupor, repeatedly going over its relationship to what was lost
and going over and over its negative experience of loss (the 1990s). But then the
ever-repeating movement of the libidinal ballet became so habitual that it allowed the
post-soviet subject to assert itself in the wide open space of loss, having internalised
the formerly external soviet order (the 2000s). Having arisen thanks to the sense of
melancholy, the narcissistic identification with the loss allowed the post-Soviet subject
to introject the soviet regime, although not in the form of a prescribed normative system
but in the form of its deconstructed and abandoned fragments.
In some ways, the subject only became soviet when it could make the ‘soviet’ part
of its infantile narcissistic fantasy. If, formerly, its ‘sovietness’ was the result of an
interpelation by an external ideological instance, then now this ‘sovietness’ has become
an effect of its personal narcissistic identification, brought about by ‘democratic and
market choice’, when the object of such an identification is selected by the desire of
the subject itself. It is true that the ‘authentic witness’ of the past, having fallen into
the disposition of the post-soviet subject that trying to build a new identity, turned out
to be the product of its very own narcissistic fixation on a lost tradition, a symbolic
thesaurus of which has been fragmented and decategorized. So now the narcissistic –
melancholic libido swims freely in the flowing space of tradition, having divested itself
of its former rigid structure. The details of the destroyed symbolic carcass of the USSR
have now acquired a second existence, settling on the bottom of the collective memory
Mass cinema and television production respond to this demand, creating filmic repre-
sentations of the past in which, one way or another, rather curious results are achieved.
Paradoxically, the more precisely and painstakingly these works recreate everyday life
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and the material world of things, the less this reconstructed past appears to be realistic.
The more they strive to render the past close at hand and significant for the spectator
in its visual representation, the more there arises a sense of inexpressible distance.
Patriotic war film (for instance We Are From the Future, We Are From the Future 2, The
Fog, The Fog 2; N. Mikhalkov’s Burnt By the Sun 2, F. Bondarchuk’s Stalingrad, etc.)
articulate a construction in which empathy towards the pedantically recreated material
substrate of the past and the affective charge engendered by various dramatic plots
collide with an allegorical load that is extraordinarily potent, yet completely anachronistic
in relation to this history – transforming the war itself from the status of historical event
to that of allegory, representing an absolutely contemporary agenda.
Memorial division may concerns not only to spatial or geopolitical dimension (Poland,
Ukraine, Russia, for instance) but also temporal one divided memory in each particular
culture. As well as we could see the official memorial project in Russia tends to transcend
or even to neglect any possibilities of such divisions. Thus, president Putin informed
the Federal Assembly in 2012: “For the rebirth of the national consciousness, we must
link the historical epochs together as one and return to an understanding of the simple
truth that Russia began not in 1917 and not even in 1991, but rather that we possess a
single, thousand-year-long history. When we turn to this history for support, we acquire
internal strength and the significance of our national development” (Address to the
Federal Assembly, 12.12.2012).
Who, other than the cinema, is capable of fulfilling this task of national development,
in order to “link the historical epochs together as one”? Some directors, like Aleksandr
Sokurov in his Russian Ark, connect the epochs by creating a feature film out of a single
shot, without one montage cut. Genre film works in simpler, but more effective manner:
by reinforcing the technical recreation of material contexts, while still more emphatically
underscoring the internal unity of Russian history.
The director of We Are From the Future, Andrei Maliukov, who has specialized in
patriotic war action films since the early 1980s, spoke precisely about this same link:
In my film I am seeking to show the linkage of time. We are all disunited, so
it is crucial to tie these knots together in order to understand that everything
that came before us belongs to us, and to no one else. And the things we are
living through now also belong to us, and to no one else. We are not trying
either to criticize the present or to praise it. In this film, contact between the
epochs is shown so that the viewer can understand for himself what there is
of value in the present era and what of value we have lost from that other
era. [24]
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Let’s attempt to take this seriously. The central question here is: what is there of value,
in the opinion of the creator of this film, tied to the Soviet era and to the present one,
respectively?
The answer that comes to the fore in the course of viewing this film is as follows. Our
post-Soviet era is valuable for the sex-appeal of modern gays and for its cool modern
gadgets. The Soviet era is valuable for its patriotism and for a willingness to die for the
motherland. A journey into the past makes it possible to unite these values, rendering
patriotism sexy and a willingness to die for the motherland technologically advanced.
War not only carries with it a concentrated patriotic message, but also constitutes an
excellent frame, making it possible to show what contemporary cinema is capable of
achieving. If there had been no war, it would have been necessary to dream it up.
War provides a perfect excuse to use special effects, and what kind of affective impact
can one have on a modern viewer without special effects? The film’s producer, Sergei
Shumakov, addressed precisely this topic:
In order to make the viewer think, we needed, of course, our entire technical
arsenal. War, whatever you say, is a highly impactful event; it makes an
impression. And it seems to me that there should be quite enough impres-
sions here. It’s important that, ultimately, the viewer should come to the proper
conclusions from the things we are showing him [25]
I doubt Shumakov’s musings need much interpretation.
It was a patriotic version of soviet past. Let us look at its liberal version. Here, we are
dealing with a very specific case of identification with the Soviet past, in which history
figures not in the heroic experience, but rather in the canonized forms of stylistically
marked cinematic representation. As examples, we may refer to a number of films and
television series which not only represent various periods of Soviet history, but which
also thematize in their very construction the cinematic formal poetics of that same period
(the Stalinist era and its style are represented in the film Soviet Period Park, 2006, dir. Iu.
Gusman, and in the series Orlova and Aleksandrov, 2015, dir. V. Moskalenko; the Thaw
era – in the film Stiliagi, 2008, dir. V. Todorovskii, and in his series The Thaw, 2013;
the late socialist period – in the films Vanished Empire, 2008 and Love in the USSR,
2012, dir. K. Shakhnazarov, as well as the series My 1980s, 2012–2013, dir. F. Stukov,
and the series Departing Nature, 2014, dir. D. Iosifov). In all of these films and series,
a marked tone of nostalgia (or of the non-critical ridicule of nostalgia) is connected
with the fact that historical past is presented as a fundamentally secondary cinematic
reality. In this regard, it is absolutely symptomatic that frequently enough, these series
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offer a representation of one or another era in light of the cinematic process, which
constitutes a significant plot element in itself (as in Orlova and Alexandrov, The Thaw,
and Vanishing Nature).
In this manner, filmic and televisual representation of the Thaw (for instance in
Todorovskii’s Stiliagi and The Thaw), un-realizes, or virtualizes, that era, transforming
it into a stage set. The emphatic generic nature of Todorovskii’s films endows the
cinematically represented era with an aura of ‘innate cinematicity’: cinema becomes
not merely the means of representation of the Thaw era, but rather its immanent quality
(the Thaw is equal to the cinematography of the Thaw).
For instance, in the film Stiliagi, the genre of the musical makes it possible to recode
utterly both Soviet everyday life and Soviet history. This creative reworking transforms
Soviet material into an object of ironic deconstruction, while at the same time inscribing
it into a contemporary cultural frame, turning the Soviet simultaneously into an object
of both exotic materiality and of aesthetic and emotional empathy. In some sense, the
Soviet becomes in this way both somewhat outlandish and strange, and organically part
of post-Soviet contemporaneity.
The series The Thaw (2013), as a whole, thematizes Thaw-era Moscow as a space of
cinema production. Its main characters are actors, directors and cameramen for Mosfilm,
and the entire plot is constructed around the shooting of a new film comedy. The history
of the cultural and social transformation of the second half of the 1950s (destalinization)
is presented here as the shift from the genre of the kolkhoz film comedy of Ivan Pyr’ev
to that of the new musical comedy of El’dar Riazanov and Leonid Gaidai. In some sense,
the movement of history itself is articulated in this film as a motion from one set of
stylistic forms to another (in fashion, in bodily mechanics, in behavioral norms, in film
genres, etc.). In other words, the sociocultural emancipation of the Thaw is shown in the
film as a stylistic shift in the various possible forms for representation of the Soviet. In
this case, this shift is shown through the film rendition of a story of love, that is initially
presented in its canonical Socialist Realist Stalinist version, and subsequently in the form
of a Hollywood musical (which is offered up as the new Soviet comedy of the Thaw
era). In this manner, Soviet history (as political regime, social practices, and ideological
project) is un-realized into a collection of forms for its representation.
In the same way the later socialist era of Brezhnev – a beloved period for con-
temporary television production and cinematic biopics – becomes a visual projection,
transferring to the past contemporary values of mass consumption, private life in com-
plete autonomy from politics, and individual success. It is for this reason that the ‘golden
era’ of really existing socialism, corresponding to the central ideological demand of the
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Putin era – ‘consume and depoliticize!’ – turns out to be the period of most active
nostalgic identification for contemporary Russian society.
5. Conclusion
The viewer is offered identification not with a concrete era in itself, but rather with
an already habitual filmic poetics that is associated with the era in question (Stalinist
music comedy, the lyric cinema of the Thaw, or the film of the 1970s and 1980s,
focused on familial and everyday concerns). In light of this situation, contemporary
post-Soviet nostalgia may be described as a secondary identification with the cinematic
representation of one or another era. In this way, one may correct the conceptual frame
of nostalgia, so often applied to post-Soviet society, with the addition of the following
thesis: the post-Soviet subject is not nostalgic for the different Soviet eras in themselves;
rather, nostalgic identification is stylistically mediated by the characteristic modes of
their representation in the cinema of the corresponding eras.
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